Does “Social Choice” Theory Support Heightened Judicial Review?
shutterstock.comHomegrown Varieties of Illiberal Democracy
Gdansk, Poland - September 22, 2018: Logo of Law and Justice (Robson90 / Shutterstock.com)If the Supreme Court Is Simply Partisan, Eliminate Judical Review
U.S. Supreme Court chambers (stock_photo_world / Shutterstock.com).How Judicial Review Improves the Legislative Process
Detail image of U.S. Supreme Court building (Brandon Bourdages/Shutterstock.com).How Judicial Review Creates Incentives for Reckless Legislation
Billionphotos.com/Adobe Stock ImagesWhen “Auxiliary Precautions” Undermine Republican Character
Chambers of the South Carolina Supreme Court, December 10, 2014 (Nagel Photography/Shutterstock.com).Chevron Bias, Illustrated by Statistics
Limiting the Judicial Power of Agencies
In two prior posts (here and here), I have been discussing the ideas in my new paper, “Classical Liberal Administrative Law in a Progressive World.” This post continues the series by discussing how agency adjudication should be changed.
Under current arrangements, agencies often adjudicate cases that really should be adjudicated in Article III courts. Most of the time, these adjudications are called formal adjudications since they are accompanied by a formal hearing that provides significant procedural protections. The initial decision is made by an administrative law judge (ALJ) but, if the agency does not agree with the ALJ’s decision, the agency can appeal that decision to itself and reverse the ALJ. Thus, agency adjudications are ultimately controlled by the agency.
The Dance of Judges and Publics
For the most part judges serve as a critical link in the ordinary flow of administration.
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