Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently noted that she sometimes refrained from dissenting in the cases she regarded as less important like tax disputes and saved her dissents for the big ones like those on gender equality. Unlike some of her other obviously injudicious remarks, her opinion on this matter may be widely shared among judges. When I asked a friend who had become a federal appellate judge what most surprised him, he said it was norm among his colleagues to suppress written dissent in all but important cases. He was troubled by the practice but felt pressure to conform.
My friend is right to feel uneasy. It is a bad practice. First, it smacks of judicial hubris. It is often difficult to be sure how important a decision will be in the long run.. The fabric of the law is complex. For instance, the development of minor exceptions to a doctrine can eventually lead to pressure for its overthrow. Even cases that are minor to Supreme Court justices can have large ripple effects.
This Sunday, in the print edition of the New York Times Magazine, Garry Wills joined Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in contending that the Declaration of Independence favors interpreting our Constitution in light of foreign law. They note that the Declaration is prompted by a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind.” The colonists are moved by that respect to recount publicly the causes of their need for separation from Britain. Wills and Ginsburg appear to believe the same decent respect should encourage Americans, including our justices, to resort to foreign law to help construe our Constitution.
But using this sonorous phrase of the Declaration as a support for resorting to foreign or international law has defects that are obvious from the text and context of the great document itself. First, the Declaration makes clear that this “decent respect” requires us to explain our own views to the world, not accept the views of others.
Second, the Signers appealed to a combination of natural law and their own historic rights as justification for their break with the mother country. They did not refer to foreign and international law as support for their position. For good reason. The Enlightenment age in which Declaration was written may have been cosmopolitan, as Wills argues. But the sovereign law in the monarchies of Europe and in despotisms elsewhere were not noticeably solicitous of the rights, like representation and freedom from unreasonable searches, that the Framers thought their birthright.
Many people are concerned about Donald Trump’s commitment to the rule of law, a concern I share. But the other choice in this election is a Progressive one, and Progressivism by its nature lacks that commitment. Moreover, its history shows that it permanently damages the constitutional foundations of the United States. And the United States suffers from the fevers of progressivism more than any time since the 1960s. Thus, this election pits a candidate lawless by virtue of temperament against one lawless by virtue of ideology and emboldened by the spirit of the times. The rule of law is under threat, whoever wins.
Progressivism has proved a greater long-term danger than any single individual, because it is born in part out of systematic rather than personal hostility to the Constitution. Federalism and separation of powers are obstacles to the social engineering at the heart of progressivism, and thus progressivism has tried to eviscerate these restraints. Packed with FDR appointees in the 1930s, the Supreme Court gutted the enumerated powers. The administrative state has eroded the separation of powers, making the executive ever more powerful in domestic affairs. The theory used to justify these departures from the original constitution, living constitutionalism, is itself a threat to the rule of law, because it devalues the formal rules laid down by the Constitution.
And today we see all across a society a renewed progressive disdain for the rule of law.
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is now 83 years old. One often hears it said that she ought to step down. By now, Ginsburg has a set response to this criticism: She says that she is not the only old justice. She notes that Kennedy is about to turn 80 and Breyer is going to turn 78.
I have no idea whether Ginsburg is too old to perform her duties. What I do know is that Ginsburg appears increasingly prone to making politically inappropriate statements.
In an interview last week, Ginsburg made several improper statements. First, Ginsburg gave what the New York Times describe as “an unequivocal endorsement of Judge Garland,” who President Obama had nominated for the Court but the Senate has refused to consider. It is normally considered improper for a Supreme Court justice to comment on a politically charged issue of this type.
In addition, Ginsburg also asserted that the Senate had an obligation to assess Judge Garland’s qualifications, stating “that’s their job” and “there’s nothing in the Constitution that says the president stops being president in his last year.” Not only do I regard this comment as mistaken, it is once again inappropriate. The President remains the President, of course. The Senate has simply decided not to act on this nominee. Ginsburg’s argument reads like Democratic Party talking points.
Second, Ginsburg made critical comments about Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump. She stated “I can’t imagine what this place would be — I can’t imagine what the country would be — with Donald Trump as our president.” She also suggested that if Trump were elected, it would be time to move to New Zealand.